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Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines the incentive of atomistic agricultural producers within a specific 
geographical region to differentiate and collectively market products. We develop a model that 
allows us to analyze the market and welfare effects of the main types of real-world producer 
organizations, using it to derive economic insights regarding the circumstances under which 
these organizations will evolve, and describing implications of the results obtained in the context 
of an ongoing debate between the European Union and United States. As the anticipated fixed 
costs of development and marketing increase and the anticipated size of the market falls, it 
becomes essential to increase the ability of the producer organization to control supply in order 
to ensure the coverage of fixed costs. Whenever a collective organization allows a market (with a 
new product) to exist that otherwise would not have existed there is an increase in societal 
welfare. Counterintuitively, stronger property right protection for producer organizations may be 
welfare enhancing even after a differentiated product has been developed. The reason for this 
somewhat paradoxical result is that legislation aimed at curtailing the market power of producer 
organizations may induce large technological distortions. 
 
Keywords:  agricultural products, collective promotion, geographic indications, supply control, 
quality. 
 
 1. Introduction 
We explore the microeconomic foundations and welfare implications of various mechanisms 
designed to encourage agricultural producers to geographically differentiate and collectively 
market their products. The atomistic structure of agricultural production creates a much different 
incentive structure than exists in sectors of the economy where single firms own and market 
individual brands. Because forward-looking producers recognize that other producers within the 
group will expand production in response to any price premium associated with their marketing 
efforts, alternative mechanisms including supply control are often necessary to encourage 
producers to pay the up-front costs of differentiating their products. We study market outcomes 
under various organizational structures that differ according to the intensity of supply control. 
Producers evaluate whether to establish the new organization based on the legal 
environment and the anticipated gains from doing so, relative to the fixed costs associated with 
developing and marketing the new product. We refer to the output of these legally established 
collective organizations as Geographically Differentiated Agricultural Products (GDAPs). We 
use the term “commodity” to describe the undifferentiated product that can be produced and 
marketed even in the absence of a producer organization. 
We focus on organizations controlling (and restricting) either (i) the amount of land 
devoted to the GDAP, or (ii) the production practices that are used to produce the GDAP, or (iii) 
both the amount of land and the production practices. We rank these various types of 
organizations in terms of their contribution to producer and social welfare. We also compare 
these structures to the perfectly competitive case, the monopoly or firm-specific brand case, and 
the unrestricted Pareto optimal solution (i.e., a social planner scenario). 
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Our results indicate that as the anticipated fixed costs of GDAP development and 
marketing increase, it becomes essential to increase the ability of the producer organization to 
control supply in order to ensure the emergence of the GDAP. Whenever a GDAP organization 
allows a market (with a new product) to exist that otherwise would not have existed there is an 
increase in societal welfare. However, whenever an organization exerts more supply control than 
is needed to create the GDAP, there may be a reduction in total welfare compared to 
organizations with less market power. 
Importantly, we show that legislation aimed at curbing a producer organization’s 
anticompetitive behavior may lead to reduced social welfare, even after a GDAP has been 
developed. This situation may occur because such legislation will often induce the producer 
organization to select inefficient technologies in its attempt to exploit the opportunities to 
exercise market power to the extent allowed by the law. 
While there are several theoretical papers on grading and labeling in agriculture, very few 
papers have theoretically examined the link between quality decisions and supply control by 
farmers. Hollander, Monier, and Ossard (1999) show the complexity of the farmers’ incentives 
for certifying products. In particular, they show that high-quality firms may have a lower 
proportion of their output certified than the low-quality firms. Marette and Crespi (2003) focus 
on a farmers’ cartel that emerges when certification costs are large and show that the benefit of 
the certification outweighs the negative effect arising from the price distortion when the product 
differentiation is sufficiently large. Zago and Pick (2004) study the effects of labels and 
emphasize the negative welfare effects of labels when administrative costs are high, quality 
differences are small, and/or costs differences are high. 
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Our article departs from these previous articles in that we analyze alternative types of 
organizations that are tailored to represent a wide spectrum of farm organizations that exist in the 
real world. We focus on details regarding different types of supply control, such as a land 
restriction and/or restrictive production technologies. We also include in our model the supply 
response that occurs within these organizations as atomistic member producers respond to price 
premiums. 
The incentives that are created by these organizational structures are unique to agriculture 
in two ways. First, any price-enhancing effect generated by the organization provides each 
atomistic producer within the organization with an incentive to move up and out along his 
marginal cost curve, a factor that is not important in other forms of imperfect competition. 
Second, the welfare impact of GDAPs depends very much on the ability of the organization to 
control supply and the proportion of total production over which this control is provided. This 
issue is unique to agriculture, again because the number of producers within the relevant 
geography is such that each individual producer bears none of the costs associated with his 
expansion of output. 
The present paper contributes to the literature by providing a model to analyze the market 
and welfare effects of the main types of real-world GDAP organizations, using it to derive 
economic insights regarding GDAPs, and describing implications of the results obtained in the 
context of an ongoing debate between the EU and U.S. We proceed first by describing 
alternative producer organizations, and then present the formal model. The main results are 
subsequently presented and discussed, followed by a description of the real-world implications 
of these results. 
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2. GDAP Organizations 
The first structure examined is one in which the producer organization managing the GDAP is 
prevented from controlling supply in any way. An example of this situation might include Idaho 
potatoes in the U.S. The second structure analyzed is at the opposite end relative to the first one 
in terms of competitive behavior and provides the organization managing the GDAP with 
complete market power.1 This case is included for comparison purposes only, because we are not 
familiar with any producer organization that is allowed to possess this type of market power 
because of antitrust concerns. However, the situation we describe is isomorphic to the one faced 
by any firm-specific corporate food brand that obtains its commodity input via contract 
production or from within the organization, such as that for corn flakes or frozen vegetables. 
The third type of structure under study allows the organization that manages the GDAP to 
control both the amount of land and the production practices that are used to produce the GDAP. 
In this instance, individual producers are free to select the amounts of inputs other than land, but 
they can only use the land stipulated by the organization, and they must conform to the 
regulations on production practices determined by the organization. The GDAP that best 
represents this case is the Brunello di Montalcino described in Hayes, Lence, and Stoppa (2004). 
The consortium that protects this GDAP has the power to limit the total amount of land eligible 
for grape production and to restrict the ability of producers to expand production on these limited 
acres (e.g., by forbidding the use of irrigation). 
In the fourth structure, the GDAP organization has the power to control the total amount 
of land allocated to the GDAP but not the production practices. Except for the restriction on land, 
individual producers can choose inputs and practices to produce the GDAP. An example of this 
                                                 
1To avoid having individual producer members increase output levels in response to any price premia that is 
generated, the organization also provides each producer with a fixed production quota. 
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type of structure is the “Lentils from Castelluccio di Norcia” described in Hayes, Lence, and 
Stoppa. 
The fifth and final structure analyzed is such that the organization has control over the 
production practices but not over the land area used to produce GDAP. Other than adhering to 
the production procedures set up by the organization, individual producers can select the desired 
amounts of all inputs to obtain the GDAP. This scenario is similar to some U.S. marketing 
orders, where grade and quality standards are used to both improve quality and remove excess 
output from the market. An example is Order 993 that authorizes grade, size, pack, market 
allocation, reserve pool, as well as inspection requirements to organize the market for California 
dried prunes (USDA 2006). 
 
3. The Model 
To focus attention on the essential issues previously discussed, our model is as simple and as 
general as possible while depicting the essential characteristics of the GDAP organizational 
structure. The model does not introduce any uncertainty about the success of the GDAP. 
Producers are assumed to know that if they are willing to spend a specific amount on product and 
market development, they will achieve a market of known size for the GDAP. 
As shown in Figure 1, the model assumes three points in time. At time t = 0, policy 
makers set up laws to regulate the structure and competitive behavior of producer organizations. 
At time t = 1, commodity producers in a particular, and most likely those in a favored, 
production area must decide whether a GDAP should be developed. If producers decide to 
proceed with the GDAP, at time t = 2 they establish a legal organization that invests an amount K 
of fixed costs to develop the GDAP and its market (e.g., to make potential consumers aware of 
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and willing to pay a premium for it), and at time t = 3 the GDAP is produced and consumed. 
Otherwise, no fixed costs are incurred to develop the GDAP at t = 2, and only the commodity is 
produced and consumed at time t = 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Timing Framework for the Analysis 
 
At time t = 1, producers decide whether to proceed or not by comparing the net benefits 
from developing the GDAP against the baseline of continued commodity production. As shown 
later, the net benefits to producers and society from developing the GDAP depend crucially on 
the type of producer organization involved. Producers have a vested interest in establishing the 
organization that yields the greatest producer surplus, but existing laws (e.g., antitrust rules) may 
prevent them from doing so. Hence, the producer organization formed at time t = 2 is assumed to 
be the one that yields the greatest possible producer surplus within the existing legal 
environment, and the producers’ decision at time t = 1 is based on such an assumption. Clearly, 
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the type of producer organization that can be legally formed may greatly affect whether the 
GDAP is developed and may lead to substantially different welfare outcomes for society. The 
various possible alternative organizations are examined after describing GDAP consumption and 
production in the next subsection. 
3.1. GDAP Consumption and Production 
Market development activities undertaken at time t = 2 (see Figure 1) yield a representative 
consumer with quasilinear utility U(X, XNum) ≡ u(X) + XNum subject to the budget constraint M = 
P X + XNum, where X and XNum denote aggregate consumption of the GDAP and a numéraire 
good, respectively; M is the consumer’s wealth; P represents the price of the GDAP; and u(⋅) is a 
differentiable function with u′(⋅) > 0, u″(⋅) < 0, and limX→0u′(X) = ∞.2 Using the budget constraint 
to obtain XNum = M – P X, and plugging the resulting expression into the utility function to get 
U(X, M – P X) = u(X) + M – P X, the first-order necessary condition (FOC) corresponding to 
optimal GDAP consumption is ∂U*/∂X = u′(X*) – P = 0. This yields the inverse demand function 
(3.1) and consumer surplus (3.2), respectively: 
 
(3.1) P = u′(X*), 
 
(3.2) cs(X*) ≡ M + u(X*) – u′(X*) X*. 
 
                                                 
2The assumption that limX→0u′(X) = ∞ is imposed only for convenience, because it ensures strictly positive aggregate 
production and consumption of the GDAP at time t = 2, conditional on development of the GDAP at t = 1. This is 
the only case of interest for the present study. The case of zero aggregate production and consumption of GDAP at t 
= 2 is not very illuminating, as it implies that it would never be optimal to develop the GDAP at t = 1. 
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The potential producers of the GDAP consist of a small subset of all commodity 
producers, so that they face a perfectly elastic demand for the commodity at price Pcom.3 We have 
in mind a group of producers located in an area that is favored with the characteristics required to 
produce a superior product, or at least convince consumers that the product from that area is 
somehow worth a price premium. This may be due, for example, to unique environmental 
conditions characterizing their region, or it may also be due to much lower input costs for some 
quality-enhancing input in that region. 
All producers within the region are assumed to be identical. They control an aggregate 
farmland area of A acres and can produce the commodity with a technology characterized by 
constant returns to scale in the land input and decreasing returns to scale in other variable inputs. 
Thus, if they devote all of their land to produce the commodity, profits per acre are represented 
by πcom ≡ Pcom xcom – c(xcom; θ = 1), where xcom is the commodity output per unit of land, and c(⋅) 
≥ 0 is a variable cost function satisfying the conditions c(0; θ) = 0, c1(⋅) > 0, and c11(⋅) > 0. 
Parameter θ ≥ 1 is included in the cost function because it will prove important to analyze 
GDAPs. At this point, it suffices to state that θ is normalized at its minimum possible value of θ 
= 1 for the commodity product. 
By applying standard optimization techniques, it is straightforward to show that, 
conditional on producing commodity only; maximum profits per acre are given by (3.3): 
 
(3.3) *comπ  ≡ Pcom *comx  – c( *comx , 1), 
 
                                                 
3The stated assumptions render the behavior of producers (consumers) who can only supply (consume) the 
commodity product irrelevant for the purposes of the present study. Hence, to save space, in the remainder of the 
paper the term producers (consumers) will refer to the potential producers (consumers) of the GDAP. 
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where *comx  = )1,(
1
1 comPc
−  is the optimal commodity output per acre and )1,(11 ⋅−c  denotes the 
inverse function of c1(⋅, 1). Therefore, if at time t = 1 the decision is to not develop the GDAP, 
the maximum producer surplus evaluated at time t = 3 is (A *comπ ). That is, producer surplus 
equals the total number of farmland acres times the maximum commodity profits attainable per 
acre under perfect competition. 
If the GDAP is developed, per-acre costs of producing x units of GDAP are given by c(x, 
θ) for θ ≥ θ ≥ 1, and the existing technology used to produce the commodity is not affected (i.e., 
per-acre commodity costs remain at c( *comx , 1)). Both variable costs and marginal costs are 
assumed to be increasing in parameter θ, i.e., c2(x > 0, θ) > 0 and c12(⋅) > 0, respectively. 
Parameterization of the variable cost function in terms of θ is meant to serve two purposes. First, 
θ > 1 represents the realistic situations where it is more expensive to produce the GDAP than to 
produce the commodity. Second, θ provides us with a straightforward way to model producer 
organizations that impose regulations to increase GDAP costs above what the latter would be 
otherwise. Such scenarios can be represented by organizations mandating a value for θ larger 
than the minimum technically feasible θ (e.g., by enforcing stricter-than-necessary GDAP 
production requirements such as a ban on irrigation). In the cases where θ is the only tool for the 
GDAP organization to adjust output levels, this parameter can be interpreted as a quality 
adjustment to reduce the proportion of total GDAP output that can be marketed. 
Producer surplus at time t = 3 conditional on the GDAP having been developed at t = 2 is 
therefore given by {A a [P x – c(x, θ)] + A (1 – a) *comπ }, where a ∈ (0, 1) is the share of 
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farmland devoted to GDAP production.4 That is, producer surplus equals the acres used to 
produce the GDAP (A a) times GDAP profits per acre [P x – c(x, θ)], plus the acres employed to 
produce commodity [A (1 – a)] multiplied by per-acre maximum commodity profits ( *comπ ). 
Since producer surplus is {A a [P x – c(x, θ)] + A (1 – a) *comπ } if the GDAP is developed at time 
t = 2, and (A *comπ ) otherwise, the net change in producer surplus resulting from the introduction 
of the GDAP (evaluated in monetary units of time t = 3) is (3.4): 
 
(3.4) Δps = A Δπ. 
 
In (3.4), Δπ ≡ a {[P x – c(x, θ)] – *comπ } is the change in average profits per acre from using a 
farmland share of a to produce the GDAP instead of the commodity. According to (3.4), 
conditional on having developed the GDAP at t = 2, producers will gain an amount equal to the 
per-acre profit difference from producing the GDAP instead of the commodity, multiplied by the 
number of acres used to produce the GDAP. 
As shown later, the change in producer surplus (3.4) may be greatly affected by the type 
of producer organization, as such organizations may adopt rules affecting both profits per acre [P 
x – c(x, θ)] and the proportion of land allocated to the GDAP (a). Such organizations will be 
examined following the next section’s discussion of the benchmark case of the Pareto optimal 
decision regarding development of the GDAP. 
 
                                                 
4Note that *comπ  was substituted for πcom in the producer surplus expression to streamline the presentation. The 
substitution is warranted because all of the producer-surplus-maximizing mechanisms to be discussed later imply 
maximization of per-acre commodity profits, and the latter equal *comπ  due to the assumption of perfectly elastic 
commodity demand. 
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3.2. A Social Planner’s Decision Regarding Development of the GDAP 
From a societal perspective, the GDAP should be developed if the gains to society from doing so 
exceed the associated costs. If the GDAP is not developed, then only the commodity can be 
produced at time t = 3, and the optimal commodity output for society is the same as under perfect 
competition. That is, provided the GDAP is not developed at time t = 2, the relevant societal 
surplus at time t = 3 is given by (A *comπ ).5 On the other hand, if the GDAP is developed at t = 2, 
societal surplus at t = 3 consists of the surplus from the GDAP [M + u(A a x) – A a c(x, θ)] plus 
the surplus from the commodity [A (1 − a) *comπ ]. Therefore, conditional on the GDAP having 
been developed at time t = 2, the net change in societal welfare stemming from the development 
of the new product (measured in monetary units of time t = 3) is (3.5): 
 
(3.5) Δss = M + u(A a x) – A a [c(x, θ) + *comπ ], 
 
(3.5’)  = cs(A a x) + Δps, 
 
where u(A a x) represents the benefits from consuming the GDAP output obtained by employing 
(A a) acres to produce GDAP at the rate of x units per acre, and A a c(x, θ) and A a *comπ  are the 
associated total variable costs and total opportunity costs, respectively. Expression (3.5’) is 
derived by noting that (P A a x = P X) is simply a transfer payment from consumers to producers 
that takes place in a market economy. 
                                                 
5Note that the relevant consumer surplus is zero because by assumption the group of producers under investigation 
has negligible mass relative to the entire commodity market, so the corresponding demand is infinitely elastic at 
price Pcom. 
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The FOCs for a social planner’s optimal choice of x, a, and θ to maximize (3.5) are 
 (3.6) 
SPss
x
Δ∂
∂  = A a
SP u′(A aSP xSP) – A aSP c1(xSP, θSP) = 0, 
 
(3.7) 
SPss
a
Δ∂
∂  = A [x
SP u′(A aSP xSP) – c(xSP, θSP) – A *comπ  – 1SPaλ ≤  = 0,  
 
(3.8) 
SPssΔ
θ
∂
∂  = – A a
SP c2(xSP, θSP) + SPθθλ ≥  = 0, 
 
where superscript “SP” denotes optimal values from a social planner’s standpoint, and 1
SP
aλ ≤  and 
SP
θθλ ≥  are the Lagrangian multipliers corresponding to the constraints a ≤ 1 and θ ≥ θ, 
respectively.6 
At the optimum, the increase in utility from raising GDAP output per acre by one unit 
should be equal to the associated increase in production costs (see (3.6)). According to (3.7), a 
social planner expands the share of acres devoted to GDAP production up to the point where the 
last acre used to produce the GDAP yields the same net benefit as switching this acre into 
commodity production. All acres should be used for the GDAP (commodity) if the marginal net 
benefits from the GDAP evaluated at a = 1 (0) exceed (are less than) the marginal net benefits 
from the commodity. Finally, from (3.8) it is clear that the optimum value of θ is θSP = θ. This is 
as expected, because increasing θ means higher costs, which can never be beneficial for society 
as a whole.7 
                                                 
6FOCs corresponding to the constraints are straightforward and are omitted to save space. 
7It will be shown later, however, that increasing θ may allow producers to gain at the expense of consumers. 
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From the perspective of society, the GDAP should (not) be developed if ΔssSP > (<) Kˆ , 
where Kˆ  equals K times a capitalization factor that corrects for the time value corresponding to 
the interval elapsed between times t = 2 and t = 3. Therefore, SPKˆ  ≡ ΔssSP defines the fixed 
development cost that makes the social planner indifferent about developing the GDAP. The net 
change in social surplus corresponding to the optimal social planner’s decision is )ˆ(KSS SPΔ  = 
SPKK ˆˆ1 < ˆ( )
SPss KΔ − , where condition1  is the indicator function (equal to 1 if “condition” is satisfied, 
and 0 otherwise). That is, if fixed development costs are too high ( Kˆ > SPKˆ ), developing the 
GDAP has a net negative impact on societal welfare ( ˆSPss KΔ −  < 0), so the optimal social 
planner’s decision is to not develop it, in which case society’s welfare is unchanged [ )ˆ(KSS SPΔ  
= 0]. Otherwise, if fixed development costs are sufficiently low ( Kˆ < SPKˆ ), society benefits 
from development of the GDAP ( ˆSPss KΔ −  > 0), so the optimal social planner’s decision is to 
invest in it and society’s welfare improves as a result [ )ˆ(KSS SPΔ  = ˆSPss KΔ −  > 0]. 
 
3.3. GDAP Organizations with Alternative Degrees of Supply Control 
The main role of the producer organization is to develop the GDAP and to control supply so as to 
maximize producer surplus within the confines of the law. Since the extent to which the behavior 
of producer organizations is regulated and anticompetitive practices are limited varies across 
legal jurisdictions, we proceed by assuming that producers will focus on the organization that 
yields the greatest producer surplus allowed by the law. We first discuss the polar cases of 
perfect competition and non-discriminating monopoly and then address three cases displaying 
supply controls in between those two extremes. 
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3.3.1. Case 1:  Perfect Competition 
In the polar case of perfect competition, existing laws prevent the producer organization from 
exerting any type of supply control. Therefore, if the GDAP is developed, individual producers 
maximize profits by selecting the optimal levels of per-acre GDAP output, the share of farmland 
devoted to GDAP production, and θ while receiving a competitive price for their GDAP output. 
Under such restrictions, the market-clearing FOCs for the maximum average change in profits 
per acre (Δπ) provided the GDAP is introduced at time t = 2 are (3.9) through (3.11): 
 
(3.9) 
PC
x
Δπ∂
∂ = a
PC [u′(A aPC xPC) – c1(xPC, θPC)] = 0, 
 
(3.10) 
PC
a
Δπ∂
∂  = [x
PC u′(A aPC xPC) – c(xPC, θPC)] – *comπ  – 1PCaλ ≤  = 0, 
 
(3.11) 
PCΔπ
θ
∂
∂  = – a
PC c2(xPC, θPC) + PCθθλ ≥  = 0. 
 
In the FOCs above, superscript “PC” denotes optimal values under perfect competition. Note 
that FOCs are being evaluated at the market-clearing output and consumption quantities, so that 
aggregate supply (A a x) equals aggregate demand (X) and the GDAP price is given by (3.1). 
Comparison of (3.6)-(3.8) with (3.9)-(3.11) reveals that the latter are identical to the 
former multiplied by A > 0. Therefore, when the new GDAP is developed, equilibrium 
allocations under perfect competition are optimal from a societal standpoint, i.e., xPC = xSP, aPC = 
aSP, and θPC = θSP = θ, so that ΔssPC = ΔssSP. However, from the producers’ perspective, the 
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decision whether to develop the GDAP hinges upon whether there is a net gain in producer 
surplus. That is, the producer organization’s indifference level of investment is PCKˆ  ≡ ΔpsPC. 
But it is clear from (3.5) that PCKˆ  = SPKˆ  − cs(A aSP xSP) < SPKˆ . 
The above implies that for fixed costs Kˆ  ∈ ( PCKˆ , SPKˆ ), the GDAP should be developed 
(i.e., it is Pareto optimal to do so) but it won’t be if the laws prevent producer organizations from 
exercising any kind of market power. Thus, for Kˆ  ∈ ( PCKˆ , SPKˆ ) the actual change in social 
surplus under a social planner ( )ˆ(KSS SPΔ  > 0) is strictly greater than under a perfectly 
competitive GDAP organization ( )ˆ(KSS PCΔ  = PCKK ˆˆ1 < ˆ( )PCss KΔ −  = 0). The extreme example of 
such a situation arises when the total area is not binding (i.e., A is large), in which case aPC < 1. 
This is true because 1
PC
aλ ≤  = 0 if aPC < 1, so (3.10) implies that the net change in producer surplus 
is zero (ΔpsPC = A aPC {[xPC u′(A aPC xPC) – c(xPC, θPC)] – *comπ } = 0). Consequently, the 
corresponding fixed cost of indifference under competition is zero ( PCKˆ  = 0). 
The intuition here is that the social planner takes both consumers and producers into 
account, whereas the GDAP organization will be able to cover the fixed costs only when 
producers gain. But producers recognize that they will find it difficult to create economic profits 
under this perfectly competitive scenario, so they will typically refuse to pay the fixed cost to 
develop the GDAP. However, one can envision instances where producers might find it optimal 
to develop the GDAP even under this competitive scenario. Such cases must entail favored areas 
so small that producers realize that the overall production response is limited without any other 
form of supply restriction. A possible example might include Kona coffee from Hawaii. 
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3.3.2. Case 2: Monopoly 
When the producer organization can be legally established to behave as a monopoly, individual 
producers have no choice regarding output per acre (x), the share of farmland devoted to GDAP 
production (a), or the production cost parameter θ. Individual producers must set up such 
quantities at the levels determined by the organization so as to maximize producer surplus. Here 
the word monopoly needs to be interpreted with caution. It reflects market power over the 
GDAP, not the commodity product. The strength of the monopolist’s power is therefore only as 
strong as the degree of differentiation achieved by the GDAP organization. 
The corresponding FOCs evaluated at the market-clearing quantities are (3.12) through 
(3.14): 
 
(3.12) 
MOps
x
Δ∂
∂ = A a
MO [A aMO xMO u″(A aMO xMO) + u′(A aMO xMO) – c1(xMO, θMO)] = 0, 
 
(3.13) 
MOps
a
Δ∂
∂  = A
2 aMO (xMO)2 u″(A aMO xMO) 
 
+ A [xMO u′(A aMO xMO) – c(xMO, θMO)] – A *comπ  – 1MOaλ ≤  = 0,  
 
(3.14) 
MOpsΔ
θ
∂
∂  = – A a
MO c2(xMO, θMO) + MOθθλ ≥  = 0, 
 
where superscript “MO” denotes optimal values under monopoly. FOC (3.14) implies that θMO = 
θ, i.e., like the social planner and the perfectly competitive organization, the monopoly will 
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never find it optimal to “artificially” raise production costs. However, FOCs (3.12) and (3.13) 
have an extra term involving u″(⋅) < 0 compared to the perfectly competitive counterparts (3.9) 
and (3.10), respectively. The term u″(⋅) < 0 represents the effect of a marginal increase in the 
amount of GDAP sold on its own equilibrium price. As a result, expressions (3.12) and (3.14) 
would be negative if they were evaluated at the perfectly competitive outcomes (aPC and xPC). 
Therefore, relative to perfect competition, the monopoly produces less GDAP per acre and uses 
fewer acres to produce it. 
Since the monopoly solution yields the maximum attainable producer surplus and the 
corresponding FOCs are different from the perfectly competitive FOCs, it must be the case that 
ΔpsMO > ΔpsPC, which in turn implies that the fixed costs of indifference are such that MOKˆ  > 
PCKˆ , where MOKˆ  ≡ ΔpsMO. Hence, for Kˆ  ∈ ( PCKˆ , MOKˆ ), society is better off with laws 
allowing the producer organization to behave as a monopoly rather than completely banning 
anticompetitive behavior (i.e., )ˆ(KSS MOΔ > )ˆ(KSS PCΔ  = 0, where )ˆ(KSS MOΔ  = 
MOKK ˆˆ1 < )
ˆ( KssMO −Δ ). 
By a similar argument,8 it is also clear that ΔssSP > ΔssMO, SPKˆ  > MOKˆ , and 
)ˆ(KSS SPΔ > )ˆ(KSS MOΔ  for Kˆ  < SPKˆ .9 The loss in social welfare associated with the monopoly 
relative to the social planner’s solution is due to the reduction in output per acre and the number 
of acres used. These tools are used by the monopolist to extract surplus from consumers. The 
additional surplus extracted from consumers by the monopoly explains the higher indifference 
fixed cost when compared to the perfectly competitive producer organization. 
                                                 
8Note that the social planner’s objective is to maximize social welfare, and that the corresponding FOCs are 
different from the monopoly FOCs. 
9For Kˆ  > SPKˆ , )ˆ(KSS SPΔ = )ˆ(KSS MOΔ  = 0. 
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3.3.3. Case 3: Organizations that Control Both Land and Production Practices 
Here we consider a producer organization that allows individual producers to choose the per-acre 
GDAP output level but controls the share of farmland that producers can devote to the GDAP 
and may impose production regulations that are more stringent than necessary in order to 
maximize producer surplus. This type of organization may emerge when it is illegal for the 
organization to behave as a monopoly, but the laws may allow it some control over supply. 
Conceptually, the optimal values for the GDAP share and production regulations are 
obtained in two steps. However, as can be seen from Figure 1, we model the decision process as 
if these decisions are made simultaneously. The first step consists of finding the optimal level of 
output per acre from the individual producer’s perspective, conditional on the acreage and 
production regulation restrictions x*(P, a, θ). The second step consists of maximizing producer 
surplus with respect to acreage and production regulations, taking into account the optimal 
individual producer’s response function x*(P, a, θ). 
The aforementioned two-step procedure implies that, under market-clearing conditions, 
the following FOCs must be simultaneously satisfied at the optimum: 
 
(3.15) 
a
x
θΔπ∂
∂ = a
aθ [u′(A aaθ xaθ) – c1(xaθ, θaθ)] = 0, 
 
(3.16) 
aps
a
θΔ∂
∂  = A a
aθ (xaθ)2 u″(A aaθ xaθ) (A – 
/ 0a
a
xθ
θ
πλ∂ ∂ = ) 
 
+ A [xaθ u′(A aaθ xaθ) – c(xaθ, θaθ)] – A *comπ  – 1aa θλ ≤  = 0, 
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 (3.17) 
aps θΔ
θ
∂
∂  = / 0a
a
xθ
θ
πλ∂ ∂ =  aaθ xaθ c12(xaθ, θaθ) – A aaθ c2(xaθ, θaθ) + θ θθλa ≥  = 0, 
 
where superscript “aθ” denotes optimal market-clearing values under the production 
organization that controls acreage and production regulations, xaθ ≡ x*[u′(A aaθ xaθ), aaθ, θaθ], and 
/ 0a
a
xθ
θ
πλ∂ ∂ =  > 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier corresponding to constraint (3.15). FOC (3.15) 
corresponds to the first step mentioned above, whereas FOCs (3.16) and (3.17) arise from the 
second step. 
A significant difference between the “aθ” organization and all of previous scenarios is 
that it may be optimal for the producer organization to raise artificially the costs of production by 
setting parameter θ higher than the minimum necessary θ. This is true because, unlike its 
counterparts for the previously examined regimes, FOC (3.17) includes the strictly positive term 
involving
/ 0a
a
xθ
θ
πλ∂ ∂ = . Lagrangian / 0aa xθθπλ∂ ∂ =  is positive because relaxing constraint (3.15) to (3.12) 
would allow the “aθ” organization to behave like a monopoly and increase producer surplus. 
Conditions (3.15) through (3.17) are different from the FOCs that achieve the maximum 
possible producer surplus (i.e., (3.11) through (3.14)). By standard optimization results it follows 
that Δpsaθ < ΔpsMO, so the indifference fixed costs for the organization setting acreage and 
regulating production practices are strictly smaller than the indifference fixed costs for the 
monopoly ( θaKˆ < MOKˆ , where θaKˆ  ≡ Δpsaθ). By the same reasoning, when aaθ < 1 and/or θaθ > θ 
it must also be the case that Δpsaθ > ΔpsPC and θaKˆ > PCKˆ . However, when both aaθ = 1 and θaθ = 
θ hold (as could happen if, e.g., A is small enough), the allocations under the “aθ” organization 
are the same as under perfect competition, so in such instances Δpsaθ = ΔpsPC and θaKˆ = PCKˆ . 
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3.3.4. Case 4: Organizations Controlling only Land 
A scenario involving a lesser degree of market power by the producer organization than Case 3 is 
one in which the organization controls the amount of farmland allocated to the GDAP (a) so as 
to maximize producer surplus, but individual producers choose the profit-maximizing levels of 
output per acre (x) and the production practices (θ ≥ θ). Similar to Case 3, the solution to such a 
problem can be obtained in two steps. The resulting market-clearing allocations must 
simultaneously solve FOCs (3.18) through (3.20) (with (3.18) and (3.20) corresponding to the 
first step and (3.19) to the second step): 
 
(3.18) 
a
x
Δπ∂
∂ = a
a [u′(A aa xa) – c1(xa, θa)] = 0, 
 
(3.19) 
aps
a
Δ∂
∂  = A a
a (xa)2 u″(A aa xa) (A – aa 
/ 0a
a
xπλ∂ ∂ = ) 
 
+ A [xa u′(A aa xa) – c(xa, θa)] – A *comπ  – 1aaλ ≤  = 0. 
 
(3.20) 
aΔπ
θ
∂
∂  = – a
a c2(xa, θa) + a θθλ ≥  = 0, 
 
In (3.18)-(3.20), superscript “a” denotes the solution values corresponding to the GDAP 
producer organization that only controls acreage. 
From (3.20), it is clear that individual producers set production practices at the lowest 
level compatible with obtaining the GDAP (θa = θ). Further, comparison with the FOCs for the 
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perfectly competitive scenario reveals that the only difference regards the acreage FOCs (3.10) 
and (3.19). Thus, if aa = 1 (which may happen if, e.g., A is sufficiently small), it is optimal for 
the GDAP organization to not restrict acreage, in which case the allocation under this type of 
arrangement will be identical to the allocation under perfect competition. That is, if aa = 1, Δpsa 
= ΔpsPC and aKˆ = PCKˆ , where aKˆ  ≡ Δpsa. In contrast, if aa < 1, Δpsa > ΔpsPC and aKˆ > PCKˆ .10 
Note also that the “a” organization is equivalent to an “aθ” organization restricted to have θaθ = 
θ. Thus, Δpsa < Δpsaθ and aKˆ < θaKˆ  if θaθ > θ, and Δpsa = Δpsaθ and aKˆ = θaKˆ  otherwise. 
 
3.3.5. Case 5: Organizations Controlling only Production Practices 
Finally, consider the case of a producer organization that allows individual producers to set their 
GDAP output per acre and the acreage allocations but controls the production regulations so as 
to maximize producer surplus. As in Cases 3 and 4, the resulting allocations can be obtained 
conceptually by means of a two-step procedure. Under market-clearing conditions, such 
allocations must simultaneously solve FOCs (3.21) through (3.23) (with (3.21) and (3.22) 
corresponding to the first step and (3.23) to the second step): 
 
(3.21) 
x
θΔπ∂
∂ = a
θ [u′(A aθ xθ) – c1(xθ, θθ)] = 0, 
 
(3.22) 
a
θΔπ∂
∂  = [x
θ u′(A aθ xθ) – c(xθ, θθ)] – *comπ  – 1aθλ ≤  = 0, 
 
                                                 
10Note that FOC (3.19) is different from FOC (3.10) if aa < 1. Hence, in such instances, standard optimization results 
imply that Δpsa > ΔpsPC. 
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(3.23) ps
θΔ
θ
∂
∂  = / 0xθ
θ
πλ∂ ∂ =  aθ xθ c12(xθ, θθ) – aθ c2(xθ, θθ) (A – / 0aθθπλ∂ ∂ = ) + θ θθλ ≥  = 0, 
 
where superscript “θ ” is used to represent market-clearing optimal allocations for the producer 
organization that only restrict production practices. Lagrangian multiplier 
/ 0aθ
θ
πλ∂ ∂ =  > 0 
corresponds to restriction (3.22) and is positive because relaxing this restriction would allow the 
organization to increase producer surplus by behaving like an “aθ” organization. 
Comparison of FOCs (3.23) and (3.17) shows that the “θ ” organization’s incentives to 
make production practices costlier than strictly necessary (i.e., θθ > θ) are even stronger than for 
the “aθ” organization, as for the former organization θ is the only tool available to enhance 
producer surplus. Given that the “θ” organization can be considered an “aθ ” organization 
without control over acreage, or a perfectly competitive organization with control over θ, it must 
be the case that Δpsaθ ≥ Δpsθ ≥ ΔpsPC and θaKˆ ≥ θKˆ ≥ PCKˆ , where θKˆ  ≡ Δpsθ. Inequalities are 
strict if the respective organizations effectively use their control variables (e.g., Δpsθ > ΔpsPC and 
θKˆ > PCKˆ  if θθ > θPC = θ). 
Note also that the “θ” organization will not be conducive to development of the GDAP if 
aθ < 1, because in such instances 1aθλ ≤  = 0, so (3.22) implies that the net producer surplus change 
is zero (Δpsθ = A aθ {[xθ u′(A aθ xθ) – c(xθ, θθ)] – *comπ } = 0). Consequently, the fixed cost of 
indifference is zero ( θKˆ  = 0) if acreage does not become binding under the “θ” organization. 
 
4. Further Discussion 
Some of the main results from the preceding sections can be summarized as Proposition 1. 
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Proposition 1:  The fixed costs of indifference for the social planner and the alternative types of 
producer organizations satisfy the following inequalities: 
SPKˆ  > MOKˆ  > θaKˆ  ≥ jKˆ  ≥ PCKˆ , j = a, θ. 
aKˆ  ≤ ≥ θKˆ . 
 
According to Proposition 1, ceteris paribus GDAP development is least likely to occur where the 
laws forbid any departure from perfect competition, and it is most likely to take place where the 
legal environment allows the organization to behave like a monopoly. The likelihood that the 
GDAP will be developed in legal environments in between those two extremes (i.e., allowing 
“aθ,” “a,” or “θ” organizations) is intermediate. Producer organizations with control over either 
acreage only or production practices only are more likely to develop the GDAP than the 
perfectly competitive structure, but less so than the “aθ” organization. 
For the alternative types of organizations, the rankings shown in Proposition 1 are 
derived from the rankings of the respective changes in producer surpluses. Therefore, the latter 
mimic the rankings in Proposition 1, i.e., ΔpsMO > Δpsaθ ≥ Δpsj ≥ ΔpsPC for j = a, θ.11 However, 
as discussed next, rankings of the alternative types of organizations from the perspective of 
social welfare are more ambiguous. 
 
4.1. Changes in Social Welfare Conditional on the GDAP Having Been Developed 
Insights about the rankings of societal surplus under the alternative organizations can be obtained 
by noting that each of these rankings is equivalent to a constrained social planner optimization 
                                                 
11Available from the authors is a proof that if both the “a” and “θ” organizations yield the same aggregate output, a 
sufficient condition for Δpsa > Δpsθ (i.e., aKˆ  > θKˆ  and Δssa > Δssθ ) is that the variable cost function be 
multiplicative in θ (i.e., c(x, θ) = f(x) g(θ)). 
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problem, where the constraints correspond to the conditions that must be satisfied under the 
corresponding organization. For example, take the perfectly competitive case. Conditional on 
having developed the GDAP at time t = 2, the “PC” constrained social planner problem consists 
of maximizing Δss with respect to (x, a, θ), subject to FOCs (3.9) through (3.11). As discussed 
earlier, however, the latter FOCs are equivalent to the unconstrained social planner FOCs (3.6) 
through (3.8). In other words, the constraints arising from the perfectly competitive FOCs in 
effect impose no restrictions on the social planner, and this is denoted in Table 1 by the labels 
“no restriction” on the first three cells of the perfect competition row. 
The fourth column corresponds to the restriction that aggregate output be obtained at 
minimum cost, which under perfect competition does not effectively constrain the social planner. 
To see this, consider the problem of minimizing total GDAP variable costs {A a [c(x, θ) + *comπ ]} 
with respect to x, a, and θ, subject to the restriction that aggregate output (A a x) be equal or 
greater than some fixed level X. The solution yields mcθ  = θ and λmc = A {xmc c1(xmc, θ) − [c(xmc, 
θ) + *comπ )]} ≥ 0, where λmc is the Lagrangian corresponding to the restriction 1 ≥ amc and 
superscript “mc” denotes cost-minimizing values. Lagrangian λmc represents the decrease in total 
costs of producing X if the restriction that 1 ≥ amc were relaxed by an infinitesimal amount. It is 
clear from the respective FOCs that the cost-minimization conditions are always satisfied for the 
social planner, the perfectly competitive organization, and the monopoly but not necessarily so 
by the “aθ,” “a,” and “θ” organizations. Thus, even though such organizations have less market 
power than a monopoly and therefore yield smaller “standard” deadweight losses (i.e., losses 
stemming from reduced output), they may also lead to technological efficiency losses that the 
monopoly solution does not have. 
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Table 1. Restrictions Imposed on a Social Planner’s Optimization Problem under Different 
Types of Producer Organizations 
Producer Organization Conditions Corresponding to: 
 Output 
per Acre 
(x) 
Land 
Allocation 
(a) 
Production 
Practices 
(θ) 
Cost 
Minimization 
 
Perfect Competition No restriction No restriction No restriction No restriction 
Monopoly Restriction Possible restr. No restriction No restriction 
“a” Organization No restriction Possible restr. No restriction Possible restr. 
“aθ” Organization No restriction Possible restr. Possible restr. Possible restr. 
“θ” Organization No restriction No restriction Possible restr. Possible restr. 
 
Given that, as just discussed, imposing a perfectly competitive behavior on the social 
planner does not effectively restrict him, it can be concluded that ΔssPC = ΔpsSP. Analogously, 
the social planner problem under monopoly involves maximization of Δss subject to the 
monopoly FOCs (3.12) through (3.14). In this instance, FOC (3.14) in effect does not restrict the 
social planner because, as shown before, θMO = θSP = θ. However, FOC (3.12) does restrict the 
social planner’s choice of x, and FOC (3.13) may (if aMO = 1) or may not (if aMO < 1) restrict the 
social planner’s choice of a. These results are summarized in Table 1 by the labels “restriction,” 
“possible restriction,” and “no restriction” in the cells corresponding to x, a, and θ, respectively, 
of the monopoly row. Because FOC (3.12) imposes a binding constraint on the social planner’s 
optimization, it follows that the unconstrained solution strictly dominates the constrained 
solution (i.e., ΔssSP > ΔpsMO). 
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The labels “possible restriction” and “no restriction” in the other cells of Table 1 are 
obtained following a similar reasoning. It can be seen that the restrictions under the “aθ,” “a,” 
and “θ” organizations need not be binding for the social planner. If they are (not) binding, the 
respective social surpluses are strictly less than (the same as) the social surplus for the 
unrestricted social planner, i.e., ΔssSP ≥ Δssj for j = aθ, a, θ. Further, it is not possible to rank the 
social surpluses under monopoly and the “aθ,” “a,” “θ” organizations relative to each other (Δssi 
≤ ≥ Δssj for i = MO, aθ, a, θ, and j = MO, aθ, a, θ) because the restrictions need not be nested. 
The preceding results about social surplus are summarized as Proposition 2 below. 
 
Proposition 2. Conditional on the GDAP having been developed at time t = 2, the changes in 
social welfare corresponding to the unrestricted Pareto optimum and the alternative types of 
producer organizations satisfy the following inequalities: 
ΔssSP = ΔssPC > ΔssMO > 0. 
ΔssSP = ΔssPC ≥ Δssj > 0, j = aθ, a, θ. 
Δssi ≤ ≥ Δssj, for i = MO, aθ, a, θ, and j = MO, aθ, a, θ. 
 
Proposition 2 concerns ex post changes in social welfare, i.e., changes after having developed the 
GDAP. However, as indicated by Proposition 1, the alternative types of producer organizations 
may be quite different in terms of the likelihood of leading to development of the GDAP in the 
first place. For this reason, it is essential to evaluate the ex ante changes in social welfare, i.e., 
the changes before development of the GDAP. In other words, Proposition 2 involves the 
division of an existing pie, but it is essential to determine whether the pie will exist to begin with. 
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4.2. Ex Ante Changes in Social Welfare 
Changes in ex ante social surplus depend on the fixed development costs of the GDAP and 
(when measured in monetary units of time t = 3) are given by )ˆ(KSS jΔ  = jKK ˆˆ1 < )ˆ( Kss jGI −Δ  ≥ 0 
for j = SP, PC, MO, aθ, a, θ. As discussed earlier in the social planner section, )ˆ(KSS SPΔ  ≥ 0 
because the social planner will only invest in the GDAP if doing so is conducive to greater social 
welfare. For each producer organization it is also the case that )ˆ(KSS jΔ  ≥ 0, because 
organization j will develop the organization only if the resulting producer surplus exceeds the 
fixed investment (Δpsj > Kˆ ). Since consumer surplus is strictly positive, it follows from (2.1′) 
that Δssj > Kˆ  when organization j invests in the GDAP. Therefore, )ˆ(KSS jΔ  > 0 if organization 
j invests in the GDAP and )ˆ(KSS jΔ  = 0 if it does not. 
Combining Propositions 1 and 2 with the results just derived allows us to gain insights 
about the ex ante changes in social surplus. Some key observations in this regard are summarized 
as Proposition 3 below. 
 
Proposition 3. From the perspective of time t = 0, there exists a nonempty set of fixed GDAP 
development costs Kˆ  ∈ ( PCKˆ , MOKˆ ) for which 
(a) the perfectly competitive organization yields no gains in social surplus (i.e., 
)ˆ(KSS PCΔ  = 0); 
(b) every producer organization with market power yields at least as much social surplus 
as the perfectly competitive organization (i.e., min[ )ˆ(KSS jΔ  for j = MO, a, θ, aθ] ≥ 0 = 
)ˆ(KSS PCΔ ); 
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(c) there exists a producer organization with market power that yields a strictly greater 
social surplus than the perfectly competitive organization (i.e., max[ )ˆ(KSS jΔ  for j = MO, a, θ, 
aθ] > 0 = )ˆ(KSS PCΔ ). 
 
Proposition 3 means that there are situations where legal environments enforcing perfectly 
competitive behavior on the producer organization will preclude the development of the GDAP 
even though it would be socially optimal to do so, and where less-restrictive laws regarding 
anticompetitive behavior will lead to the development of the GDAP and to improvements in 
social welfare. In other words, whenever anticompetitive laws are sufficiently relaxed so as to 
induce a GDAP to exist that otherwise would not have existed, there is an increase in welfare. 
However, whenever such laws provide the producer organization with more supply control than 
is needed to develop the GDAP, then there may be a possible reduction in total welfare 
compared to more restrictive anticompetitive regulations. 
Counterintuitively, however, Propositions 1 and 2 together imply that there need not be 
an inverse relationship between the ex ante incentives to invest in GDAP development and the 
ex post social surplus for the various types of organizations that are not legally constrained to 
behave competitively. For example, there are circumstances where the “aθ” provides both a 
greater incentive to invest in the GDAP and a larger social surplus ex post than the “θ” 
organization (Δpsaθ > Δpsθ and Δssaθ > Δssθ). The reason for this paradoxical result is that the 
“aθ,” “a,” and “θ” organizations may involve substantial technical inefficiencies. 
 
29 
5. Implications of the Results for U.S. and EU GDAPs 
The previous results can be applied to draw some implications about GDAPs in the U.S. and the 
EU. In terms of the proposed model, it is arguably the case that the EU system of geographic 
indications (GIs) that regulates most of its GDAPs allows for “aθ” organizations, whereas in the 
U.S. only “θ” organizations can exist legally. 
EU GIs, known separately as PDO (Protected Designation of Origin), PGI (Protected 
Geographical Indication), and TSG (Traditional Speciality Guaranteed), were created in 1992 to 
promote and protect food products (EC 1992). Since then, the EU has approved 684 foods for 
protection under these designations. In addition, it currently lists 200 applications pending, of 
which 27 were added in the first six months of 2005 (European Commission 2006). Most of the 
new European GDAPs have evolved from submissions by producer groups that describe and 
limit the area within which the new GDAP can be produced. Some of them impose additional 
control over production practices, and the output of these GDAPs is quite small relative to the 
commodity market. 
In contrast, existing U.S. GDAP rules have been explicitly designed to prohibit acreage 
control; however, some federal marketing orders do allow post-harvest quality and/or size 
adjustments that can be viewed as a form of control over production practices. In the U.S., 
GDAPs are protected as certification marks (U.S. Congress 2003). A certification mark is subject 
to cancellation if its owner “…refuses to certify or to continue to certify the goods or services of 
any person who maintains the standards or conditions which such mark certifies” (Hannon 2002, 
§1306.07). By design, certification marks cannot be used to control supply. Another possible 
supply control mechanism in the U.S. is the use of a trademark; however, as described in Addor 
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and Graziou (2002, pp. 869-870), trademarks “bear an individual ownership approach” whereas 
EU GIs “meet the collective approach.” 
Note also that although some of the GDAPs in the EU have ancestral origins that predate 
the enactment of the 1992 EU GI system that regulates most of its GDAPs, many EU GIs such as 
Scottish Farmed Salmon are of relatively recent origin. Finally, and possibly more 
controversially, it may also be argued that U.S. producers have had access to information for a 
long enough time to have optimized their organizations in a way that maximizes producer 
surplus given the legal constraints. This means that the U.S. marketplace has served as a natural 
experiment with any GDAP organizations that are likely to be formed having already formed. 
The situation is different in the EU, because the existing rules controlling the formation of 
GDAPs have changed several times in recent history.12 
In the context of our model, the above generalizations imply that the ex post welfare 
results apply if some of the EU GDAPs predate the GI system. If that were the case, it can be 
concluded that for these older GDAPs, the 1992 EU GI legislation simply served the purpose of 
enhancing producers’ surplus at the expense of consumers, with a total net loss in societal 
welfare. In contrast, for the many new EU GDAPs that would not have existed without the GI 
system, the above generalizations suggest that the recent surge in GDAP formation in the EU has 
improved societal surplus, and that the institutional incentives that led to the formation of these 
new GDAPs would enhance producer and consumer surpluses in the U.S. Interestingly, these 
                                                 
12Reflecting philosophical and legislative differences regarding the ability of the EU to enforce the property right 
protections of GIs internationally, the U.S. filed a complaint in 2002 with the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
against the EU policy on grounds that it discriminates against non-EU GIs and that it does not provide sufficient 
protection to pre-existing U.S. trademarks that may conflict with EU-designated GIs (Josling 2005). The U.S. 
position with respect to its domestic market is that its trademark laws (in the form of certification marks) adequately 
protect U.S. and non-U.S. GDAPs alike, and that there is no further need for special property right protection for 
GDAPs. The resulting WTO panel on GIs (WTO 2005) recently led the EU to amend some points of the EC 
regulation 2081/92 by the regulation 510/2006 (EC 2006) to comply with the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and recognize non-EU GIs and protect third-party trademarks. 
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implications are in direct opposition to the current position of the U.S. government and U.S. farm 
groups. For example the official position of the American Farm Bureau is that “We are strongly 
opposed to GI’s” (Stallman 2003). 
Besides suggesting that the EU GI system weakly dominates the U.S. GDAP legislation 
in terms of producer surplus, our results allow for the counterintuitive possibility that the EU 
system may dominate the U.S. one even in terms of ex post social surplus. The latter implication 
is possible because the U.S. approach provides producer organizations with fewer instruments to 
control supply, and in so doing may induce such organizations to distort production practices in 
such a way that output is obtained in a less efficient manner than it could otherwise. 
Put succinctly, our results strongly suggest that from the perspective of both producer 
surplus and societal surplus, the U.S. GDAP legislation (based on certification marks and 
marketing orders) is not equivalent to the EU GI system. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Individual firms who have adequate intellectual property right protection have the incentive to 
innovate and market products because they realize that they can capture the rents associated with 
success. This incentive does not exist in commodity agriculture because rational producers 
realize that other producers will expand production in response to any economic rents that result 
from successful innovations. 
The present study applies standard welfare analysis to the case in which atomistic 
producers are involved in the creation of geographically differentiated agricultural products 
(GDAPs). It is shown that, as expected, the stronger the level of property right protection, the 
greater the incentives for producers to develop GDAPs that do not yet exist. Counterintuitively, 
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stronger property right protection for producer organizations may be welfare enhancing even 
after a GDAP has been developed. The reason for this somewhat paradoxical result is that GDAP 
legislation aimed at curtailing the market power of producer organizations may induce large 
technological distortions. 
In the context of GDAP legislation in the EU and the U.S., we argue that, to the extent 
that the assumptions made in the advocated model are correct, the EU rules are likely to 
dominate in terms of ex ante societal surplus (i.e., surplus that accounts for the incentives to 
develop GDAPs). A natural extension of this logic is that the U.S. has seen about as much 
innovation as it is likely to see under the GDAP rules it has in place. Therefore, any extension of 
such rules providing producer organizations with stronger control over supply should lead to an 
increase in the formation of GDAP organizations and ultimately in social welfare. This result is 
in direct opposition to the current position of the U.S. government and U.S. commodity groups. 
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